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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Timothy Kellis's petition for 
post-conviction relief The order of summary dismissal should be reversed because the district 
court failed to give Mr. Kellis proper notice. Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Pacts 
On November 12, 2008, the district court entered a judgment of conviction against Mr. 
Kellis following a jury trial on twelve counts (nine counts oflewd conduct with a minor, LC.§ 
18-1508; one count of attempted lewd conduct with a minor, I.C. §§ 18-306, 18-1508; and two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child, I.C. § 18-1506). R Vol. I, pp. 117-122. The charges stemmed 
from allegations of misconduct with teenage boys, much of which occurred at Camp Grizzly, a 
Boy Scout camp where Mr. Kellis worked. R Vol. I, pp. 132-133. The district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of life with fifteen years fixed for each of the nine counts of lewd 
conduct, fifteen years with five years fixed for the count of attempted lewd conduct, and twenty-
five years with fifteen years fixed for each of the two counts of sexual abuse. R Vol. I, pp. 117-
122. 
Mr. Kellis appealed and was represented by SAPD. On appeal, counsel raised two issues: 
whether the district court violated Mr. Kellis's constitutional rights by imposing more severe 
sentences as punishment for his continued assertion of innocence and whether the district court 
imposed excessive sentences. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision and the 
remittitur issued on May 4, 2010. R Vol. I, pp. 132-139. 
Mr. Kellis filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on August 27, 2010. R Vol. I, 
pp. 14-52. The district court appointed counsel who filed an amended and a second amended 
petition. R Vol. I, pp. 185, 191-197; Vol. II, pp. 313-320. Ultimately, the district court granted 
the state's motion for summary disposition, denying Mr. Kellis relief. R Vol. II, pp. 425-441. A 
final judgment was entered. R Vol. II, pp. 423-424. And, this appeal timely followed. R Vol. II, 
pp. 442-445. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Kellis's petition without proper 
notice per LC. § l 9-4906(b )? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Petition Without Proper Notice 
The district court dismissed Mr. Kellis's petition for post-conviction relief in part on 
grounds other than the grounds set out in the state's motion for summary disposition. Therefore, 
the dismissal was in part sua sponte and without proper notice. The appropriate remedy is 
reversal of the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, supra: 
Pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b ), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an 
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice 
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be 
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906(c), if the state files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss, 
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State, 
127 Idaho 319,322,900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b), 
but not section ( c ), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is 
that, under subsection ( c ), the motion itself serves as notice that summary 
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b )(1) requires 
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See DeRushe v. State, 
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146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable 
particularity in post-conviction cases.) If the state's motion fails to give such 
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if 
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to 
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to LC.§ 19-4906(b). See 
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state 
has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application 
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its 
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice. 
147 Idaho at 517,211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismissed a claim based upon 
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and 
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with 
a 20-day notice period.") 
Mr. Kellis's second amended petition requested relief based upon the ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. R Vol. II, pp. 313-320. The petition set out 13 
subclaims of ineffective assistance. R Vol. II, pp. 314-318. The district court summarily 
dismissed the petition based upon the state's motion and briefs. R Vol. II, pp. 425-440. Some of 
the subclaims were dismissed on the same grounds as cited by the state in its motion and briefing 
and those subclaims will not be discussed here. However, several of the subclaims were 
dismissed on grounds other than those identified by the state. Those claims, which will be 
individually discussed below, were improperly dismissed because the district court failed to give 
Mr. Kellis 20-days notice of its intent to dismiss. Buss, supra; Kelly, supra. 
Mr. Kellis's first claim was that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and 
present evidence that the four boys who made delayed allegations against him had made 
immediate allegations against the camp director the year before they accused Mr. Kellis and the 
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previous allegations resulted in the termination ofthe camp director. R Vol. II, pp. 314-315. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Kellis averred that he now believed that the boys had made the 
accusations toward the prior director and himself as a means to get rid of those they did not like. 
R Vol. II, p. 341. 
In his second amended petition, Mr. Kellis set out that the prior allegations and 
subsequent firing of the camp director were relevant and the failure to bring them out at trial was 
prejudicial because the evidence would have shown that they boys had previously disclosed 
immediately, rather than waiting as they did in Mr. Kellis's case; that previously the boys had 
acted in accord with their training by immediately disclosing, something not done in Mr. Kellis's 
case; the boys knew that reporting would be taken seriously and action would be taken; that the 
boys were not prevented from reporting in the past because of embarrassment or timidity; and 
that the boys had previously been questioned by adults regarding inappropriate conduct and were 
not afraid of such questioning. R Vol. II p. 315. Mr Kellis supported his petition with, among 
other items, a letter he had written to Tim McCandles during the investigation of the allegations 
against the prior camp director. R Vol. II, p. 359-360. 
The state moved for summary disposition of this claim on the general basis that all the 
subclaims failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding deficient performance and 
prejudice. R Vol. II, p. 199. In particular, the state argued as to this first subclaim that the letter 
Mr. Kellis alleged he sent to Mr. McCandles did not support the assertion that the four boys 
made prior inappropriate touching allegations, implied that the letter was likely manufactured 
after the fact to support the petition, and stated that the letter was never actually received by the 
Boy Scouts. The state also asserted that the letter, even if genuine, did not support an attack on 
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the boys' credibility because it concerned only two of the four accusers and because the letter 
only claimed that the prior camp director had looked into their tent without permission and had 
entered another camper's tent without permission and looked through a bag, and therefore "this 
claim is without merit." R Vol. I, p. 209-210. 
In response, Mr. Kellis deposed Mr. McCandles and both Mr. Kellis and counsel filed 
affidavits and related materials including letters from the Scouts to the prior director supporting 
the claim that the same accusers had previously accused the camp director of sexual misconduct. 
The materials demonstrated that the director was accused and dismissed from the camp for 
inappropriately grabbing the front of a Scout's swimsuit, inappropriate touching, showing a lack 
of respect for privacy, and exhibiting a lack of modesty in personal appearance among other 
issues. See discussions of Mr. McCandles' deposition and the letter of termination to the prior 
director. R Vol. II, pp. 325-342, 391-393. These materials supported the claim that had prior 
counsel investigated, he would have been able to use this evidence at trial, which would have 
resulted in a significant negative impact on the credibility of the accusers. Mr. Kellis also argued 
that the failure to investigate and present this evidence was prejudicial. R Vol. II, p. 356. 
The district court summarily dismissed this subclaim. First, the court noted that the boys' 
accusations the year before against the camp director had been a "significant part" of Mr. Kellis's 
trial, quoting defense counsel's closing argument on that point. The court then stated: 
Kellis maintains that the individuals who accused him also brought down the 
Camp Director. However, he has not presented admissible evidence to support 
this claim. A petition must be supported by admissible evidence which is attached 
to the petition. Roman [v. State], 125 Idaho [644,] 648, 873 P.3d [898,] 902 [(Ct. 
App. 1994)]. Therefore, this claim fails as a threshold matter. 
In addition, while Kellis argues that the investigation would have affected his 
5 
accusers' credibility, he does not argue that the investigation would have affected 
the outcome of the trial. In particular, Kellis argues that the investigation would 
have revealed that his accusers knew how to report inappropriate touching and 
should have reported the allegations against him earlier, not that they had 
fabricated their accusations. As a result, Kellis has not sufficient alleged facts to 
support the second prong of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984)] test. 
R Vol. II, p. 429-430. 
The district court's dismissal was on grounds other than those asserted by the state in its 
motion and brief. The state focused its motion for summary dismissal on the alleged falsity of 
the letter and its argument that the letter did not involve the same boys or sexual misconduct. 
Mr. Kellis responded by deposing Mr. McCandles and presenting affidavits from himself and 
counsel regarding the authenticity of the letter and the sexual misconduct nature of the 
accusations made against the prior director. Mr. Kellis set out how this evidence could have 
been used at trial along with his argument that "there is a reasonable probability that absent the 
deficiencies, the outcome might well have been different." R Vol. II, p. 356. 
The district court did not make factual findings that the letter from Mr. Kellis to the 
Scouts during the investigation of the prior camp director was not genuine, as urged by the state. 
Nor did the district court determine that the letter did not involve the same boys as later accused 
Mr. Kellis. Rather, the court just stated that Mr. Kellis had not attached admissible evidence to 
his petition to support his theory that "the individuals who accused him also brought down the 
Camp Director." And, then the court incorrectly asserted that Mr. Kellis had not argued 
prejudice. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing on grounds other than those presented by 
the state in its motion for summary dismissal without giving its own independent notice and 20 
days to respond and reversal is required. Buss, supra. 
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Moreover, even if the state had given notice of the reasons cited by the district court for 
summary dismissal, dismissal would not have been appropriate. "[I]f the petition, affidavits, and 
other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed." Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 
791,796,291 P.3d 474,479 (Ct. App. 2012). "If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues." Id. 
Mr. Kellis claimed that counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that the four 
boys who accused him by means of delayed reporting had earlier made a timely accusation 
against the camp director. This claim was supported by the deposition of Mr. McCandles and the 
letters served on the camp director notifying him that he was being given a formal, written 
warning for inappropriate touching, lack of respect for privacy and lack of modesty. R Vol. II, 
pp. 325-336. 
This evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was deficient 
in failing to investigate and present this evidence. Mr. Kellis also made an argument, which 
raised a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether this failure to investigate and present 
evidence was prejudicial. Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. 
Schultz, supra. 
Mr. Kellis's third claim of ineffective assistance was that counsel was ineffective in not 
obtaining the assistance of an expert who could have examined the conduct of the four accusers 
with respect to whether they exhibited any symptoms common to victims of sexual abuse, with 
respect to their failure to make their allegations until approximately eight months after the 
alleged wrongdoing in light of their having made similar accusations immediately after 
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wrongdoing the prior year, with respect to their continued contact with Mr. Kellis after the 
alleged wrongdoing, and with respect to their possible motivations to fabricate allegations. R 
Vol. II, p. 316. The state moved for summary dismissal of this claim because Mr. Kellis did not 
identify how the failure to consult with an expert adversely affected his case. R Vol. I, p. 213. 
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because courts will not second guess a 
tactical decision without evidence that the decision was based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the law or some other objective shortcoming and Mr. Kellis had failed to allege any 
facts that would support the conclusion that counsel made the decision to not call an expert based 
upon some objective shortcoming. R Vol. II, p. 432. 
The district court's order of summary dismissal was based upon grounds not asserted by 
the state. Therefore, given the absence of an independent notice from the court with 20 days to 
respond, the summary dismissal of this claim was inappropriate and reversal is required. Buss, 
supra. 
Mr. Kellis's seventh claim of ineffective assistance was that trial counsel failed to obtain 
the services of an expert to determine whether there was any physical evidence such as DNA of 
Mr. Kellis on the property of the four accusers including inside their sleeping bags. R Vol. II, p. 
317. The state moved for summary dismissal on the basis that not all of the incidents occurred in 
the boys' tents and there was no testimony or other evidence of ejaculation so the allegation was 
purely speculative, bare, conclusory, and unsubstantiated by fact. R Vol. I, p. 215. 
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because the decision of which 
witnesses to call is a tactical decision which will not be second guessed without evidence of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law or other shortcomings capable of objective 
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evaluation. R Vol. II, p. 435-436. 
Again, the district court dismissed on grounds other than those asserted in the state's 
motion and supporting briefing without giving Mr. Kellis independent notice of the basis for 
dismissal and 20 days to respond. Again, this was inappropriate and reversal is required. Buss, 
supra. 
Mr. Kellis's ninth claim of ineffective assistance was that counsel failed to call a witness 
who could have contradicted the testimony of one of the accusers that Mr. Kellis had supplied the 
accuser with alcohol while on a trip to an amusement park and further that counsel failed to 
object to the accuser's testimony regarding the alcohol under IRE 404(b) and the rules of 
relevancy. R Vol. II, pp. 317-318. The state moved for summary disposition on the grounds that 
the testimony from the accuser was properly admitted as evidence of grooming and to explain the 
delayed disclosure. The state further argued that Mr. Kellis had not shown the failure to object 
was objectively unreasonable or that it was prejudicial. R Vol. II, pp. 216-217. The state did not 
address the question of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to call the witness who could 
have contradicted the accuser. Id. 
The district court dismissed this claim because Mr. Kellis had not shown that the failure 
to call the witness who could have contradicted the accuser regarding the alcohol was because 
counsel was unprepared, ignorant of the law, or based upon some other objective shortcoming. 
The court further held that the evidence that Mr. Kellis had not provided alcohol had little to do 
with the outcome of the case. The court did not address the question of whether counsel's 
performance was deficient in failing to object to the accuser's testimony about the alcohol. R 
Vol. II, p. 437. 
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Again, the district court dismissed on grounds other than those set out by the state, and 
again this was error. And, in this instance the court actually failed to even address part of the 
claim. Thus, reversal is required. Buss, supra. 
The district court dismissed four of Mr. Kellis's claims on grounds other than those 
asserted by the state in its motion and briefing. This is reversible error. The order of summary 
dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Kellis respectfully requests that the order of summary 
disposition be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings including an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Submitted this ~day of January, 2014. 
~Ji W, id, 
Deborah Whipple'Ltfl-'4 
Attorney for Timothy Kellis 
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